Recently, Africa has emerged as a crucial arena for global powers seeking to expand their influence. The continent’s abundant natural resources, strategic geographic position, and burgeoning markets have attracted attention from nations worldwide. This renewed interest has led to a complex web of alliances and partnerships, reminiscent of the geopolitical manoeuvrings of the Cold War era.
Africa’s strategic importance is evident in the increasing number of foreign military installations on its soil. Nowhere is this more visible than in Djibouti, a small country in the Horn of Africa that has become a hub for international military presence. The United States operates Camp Lemonnier, the only permanent American military base in Africa, which supports counterterrorism operations across the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula and hosts roughly 4,000 personnel.
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China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, investing an estimated $590 million in the facility near the Doraleh port. The base, staffed by about 400 personnel, is designed to protect China’s maritime routes and project influence in East Africa. France has maintained a strong military presence in Djibouti since its independence, operating a naval base and an airbase, which are key to France’s operations in the region. Japan, too, established its only overseas base in Djibouti in 2011 to support anti-piracy operations and regional security, deploying around 180 troops. Italy joined this geopolitical contest with its Military Support Base, which became operational in 2013 and plays a central role in counter-terrorism efforts and naval operations. Djibouti, in turn, has benefitted economically; revenues from foreign military bases constituted about 18% of its income in 2020, highlighting how military presence has become an economic strategy.
The Sahel’s Security Pivot and the Russian Factor
Beyond Djibouti, a more complex and sweeping transformation is unfolding across the continent. In the Sahel region, there has been a notable reconfiguration of military alliances and partnerships. Russia has committed to supporting the military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger by providing arms and training for a planned 5,000-strong force to be deployed in the central Sahel region, according to an official statement. The three West African nations, currently governed by juntas that seized power through recent coups, have formed a coalition known as the Alliance of Sahel States. These countries, which recently severed security ties with France and the United States and exited the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), announced the formation of a 5,000-strong joint force to tackle jihadist insurgencies. This move signals a sharp pivot away from Western influence and an embrace of Russia as a new security partner. The withdrawal of Western troops, including the French Barkhane force, has left a vacuum that Russia is keen to fill, reinforcing narratives of a new Cold War dynamic taking shape across the Sahel.
Mineral Diplomacy in the Congo and the New Resource War
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), strategic minerals are the main battleground in this global contest for influence. The United States has intensified its engagement with the DRC by proposing multi-billion-dollar investments in its mineral sector. These talks, reported in April 2025, are designed to challenge China’s dominance in markets for critical materials like cobalt, lithium, and uranium, essential for electric vehicle batteries, renewable energy technologies, and military applications. China, which already controls an estimated 70% of the global cobalt supply and holds significant stakes in Congolese mines, is being directly countered by Washington’s renewed push for strategic partnerships in the region. The U.S. also seeks to promote more transparent and environmentally responsible mining practices, appealing to international investors wary of China’s track record.
The Infrastructure Cold War: Angola’s Strategic Corridor
A similar pattern can be observed in Angola, where geopolitics and infrastructure intersect. In December 2024, U.S. President Joe Biden visited the Angolan port city of Lobito to promote the Lobito Corridor project, a railway expansion plan that aims to transport critical minerals from the DRC to Atlantic ports. Backed by a $550 million loan, the initiative is part of a broader effort to provide alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. By improving connectivity across Angola, Zambia, and the DRC, the U.S. is trying to cement its economic footprint while enabling more efficient export routes for minerals needed by Western industries. Angola’s role in this emerging corridor reflects a broader shift where infrastructure diplomacy and resource control are central to global power strategies.
China, Russia, and the Rebalancing of Global Power
On a global scale, these manoeuvres reflect broader trends of power rebalancing. The post-Cold War unipolar moment dominated by the United States is giving way to a multipolar world order, in which China and Russia assert themselves more confidently on the world stage. Africa, with its vast resources and strategic geography, is no longer viewed merely as a recipient of aid but as a critical player in global security and economic competition. For instance, China’s growing influence is not limited to military presence. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has poured over $700 billion, according to Beijing’s commerce ministry, into African infrastructure projects over the last two decades, building roads, ports, and power plants. Meanwhile, Russia has used private military contractors such as the Wagner Group to gain influence in the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, and Mali, offering security services in exchange for mining concessions and political support.
African Agency in a Polarised World
Despite the influx of foreign attention, African nations are not merely passive actors in this game. Many governments are leveraging these global rivalries to secure better deals, diversify their partnerships, and assert national interests. For example, Rwanda has maintained a careful balance in foreign relations, collaborating with both Western nations and China while investing in its defence capabilities. Similarly, Ghana and Kenya have focused on strengthening regional security alliances and peacekeeping missions under the African Union, positioning themselves as stabilising forces amid broader geopolitical shifts.
The Risks and Realities of External Militarisation
However, the risks of this complex geopolitical chessboard are significant. The militarisation of African territories raises concerns about the erosion of sovereignty and the potential for proxy conflicts. The over-reliance on foreign security actors can weaken domestic institutions and hinder the development of sustainable, locally driven security frameworks. Additionally, economic dependencies on foreign investments can exacerbate debt vulnerabilities and reduce policy autonomy. In places like Sudan and Libya, the influx of foreign military actors has often prolonged conflicts rather than resolved them, demonstrating the dangers of external meddling.
Choosing Sovereignty Amid Superpower Rivalry
In conclusion, Africa’s evolving alliances and the renewed interest from global powers reflect the continent’s strategic centrality in contemporary geopolitics. The presence of foreign military bases, the influx of infrastructure investments, and the strategic repositioning of African governments paint a picture of a continent that is both a stage and a player in the new global order. While opportunities abound for economic growth and improved security, the challenge for African nations lies in navigating these external interests to serve their own developmental and sovereign objectives. As the lines of the New Cold War are drawn, Africa must ensure it is not merely a battleground for others’ ambitions but a stakeholder shaping its own future.